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ABSTRACT 
 
There is a large econometric literature that examines the economic assimilation of 
immigrants in the United States and elsewhere. On the whole immigrants are seen as 
atomistic individuals assimilating in a largely anonymous labour market, a view that runs 
counter to the spirit of the equally large literature on ethnic groups. Here we argue that 
immigrants assimilate as communities, not just as individuals. The longer the immigrant 
community has been established the better adjusted it is to the host society and the more 
the host society comes to accept that ethnic group. Thus economic outcomes for 
immigrants should depend not just on their own characteristics, but also on the legacy of 
past immigration from the same country. In this paper we test this hypothesis using data 
from a 5 percent sample of the 1980, 1990 and 2000 US censuses. We find that history 
matters in immigrant assimilation: the stronger is the tradition of immigration from a 
given source country, the better the economic outcomes for new immigrants from that 
source.  
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Introduction  
Studies of immigrant assimilation have proliferated in the last three decades. This 
literature has focused on how rapidly after arrival (and to what extent) the earnings of 
immigrants catch up with those of natives. The ensuing debate has focused on cohort 
effects, on language acquisition and on assimilation in other economic dimensions. But 
for the most part, immigrant assimilation is viewed as individualistic rather than 
community based. Not surprisingly other social scientists look askance at what seems a 
rather narrow view taken by economists of the assimilation experience. Meanwhile a 
large literature (mainly by non-economists) has developed that sees immigrants as 
communities, not merely as individuals.1 This implies that the assimilation experience of 
particular ethnic origin groups must be viewed as just that: the assimilation of groups, 
rather than of individuals who happen to be part of such groups.  
 In recent years economists have paid more attention to the role of the ethnic 
communities in conditioning patterns of assimilation among individuals within that 
group. These studies have examined the effects of ethnic concentration and immigrant 
ghettos on the economic outcomes of immigrants through processes such as the 
acquisition of language skills and mobility across occupations and localities. But this still 
treats the ethnic community itself as a given. A better approach is to regard the 
assimilation process as a two-way street. Assimilation depends not only on how 
immigrants fit into the host country’s labour market and its wider culture, but also on the 
degree to which the non-immigrant community accepts, accommodates and adapts to 
particular immigrant groups. If we adopt this view then history matters: the more 
established is the tradition of immigration from a particular source, the more integrated 
that ethnic community will be, and the more easily new immigrants from that source will 
assimilate into the host labour market. 
 In this paper we explore the evidence that history matters. The following sections 
provide a brief survey of the relevant literature and an outline of the changing 
relationship between the origins of immigrants and their performance in the labour 
market. We then turn to examining whether the earnings of current immigrants are 
positively influenced by the history of immigration from the same source region. We find 
                                                 
1 Major contributions include Lieberson and Waters (1990), Portes and Rumbaut (1996) and Rodriguez 
(1999). 
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that—holding constant an immigrant’s own characteristics—these immigration traditions 
do indeed have positive effects on immigrant earnings when analysed both at the national 
level and at the regional level. Finally we examine some other indicators of the social 
acceptance of immigrants from different source regions, including intermarriage and 
opinion surveys. The evidence seems to suggest that immigrants from traditional sources 
have higher approval ratings. We conclude that the melting pot still works—but it works 
at the community level and with considerable historical lags.    
 
Individual and group assimilation  
The analysis of earnings and other economic outcomes for immigrants that was 
pioneered by Chiswick (1978) largely sees assimilation as a process of individual 
improvement in a largely anonymous labour market. The individual’s earnings are a 
function of his/her education and other relevant human capital variables including the 
number of years since arrival in the host country. The effect of years since migration 
reflects the individual’s adaptation and to the host country labour market through the 
acquisition of relevant skills and experience.  More recent studies start from the premise 
that because the foreign-born have characteristics and skills that differ from those of the 
host community there are potential gains from trade (Lazear 2000), but these differences 
can also act as barriers to communication and hence to trade. Chiswick and Miller (2002) 
argue that the larger is the ethnic group, the greater is the supply and hence the lower is 
the price of ‘ethnic goods’. Hence the larger is the ethnic concentration in a particular 
locality the worse will be the labour market outcomes of immigrants in that community. 
In areas where there are relatively few co-ethnics the price of ethnic goods will be higher 
and an individual has a greater incentive to invest in reducing the barriers, for example 
through language acquisition. 
 There are a variety of possible effects on individuals’ earnings arising from ethnic 
concentration. One is that there may be economies of scale or network effects in the 
production of ethnic goods and hence incomes might be higher where there are greater 
agglomerations of co-ethnics. Similarly, if there is discrimination against immigrants in 
the wider community either in jobs or in housing then individuals will gain by staying 
within their ethnic communities. On the other hand ethnic communities may involve 
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crowding externalities, negative peer group effects, and reduced opportunities for 
profitable trade.  Hence the effects of ethnic concentrations on immigrant outcomes could 
go either way and the results may differ across ethnic groups and with the characteristics 
of the individual immigrant. 2  
Studies have also shown the there is persistence across the generations in the 
labour market performance of immigrants and their children. Borjas (1992) finds that that 
the income, education and occupational prestige of second-generation immigrants are 
inherited partly from their parents and partly, as an ethnic capital externality, from the 
ethnic group as a whole. The results suggest that there is considerable persistence in 
performance from one generation to the next, much of it arising from the transmission of 
ethnic capital. Hence “ethnic capital effectively lowers the flame under the melting pot 
from a full boil to a slow simmer” (Borjas, 1999b, p. 14).  This ethnic capital effect might 
be equally important for first generation immigrants: the higher the ethnic capital of a 
particular origin group, the better the performance of new immigrants from that origin.  
 These are significant advances that take the study of immigrant assimilation 
beyond the simple individualistic approach. But they still fail to capture the interaction 
between immigrant communities or ethnic groups and the host society. Such notions have 
been taken more seriously in the recent sociological literature on immigration which has 
moved beyond the so-called assimilationist approach, focusing more on “the process of 
interaction between host society institutions and structures and the characteristics of 
newcomers.” “While the assimilation perspective portrayed American society as a rather 
amorphous, homogenous entity, an absorbent sponge, the newer theories gave shape to 
this amorphous entity. They pointed out that the sponge is structured and that structure 
itself is subject to change” (Schmitter Heisler, 2000, p. 79). 
 Since the pioneering work of Glazer and Moynihan (1963) and Gordon (1964) 
sociological research has focused on how immigrants from different origin countries and 
regions have evolved into distinct ethnic groups. These studies have increasingly brought 
                                                 
2 A number of studies have addressed the endogeneity issue that arises from migration across localities. 
Those that choose to migrate away from the ghetto may have superior characteristics and hence the 
measured effect of ethnic concentration may be partly due to self-selection.  For various treatments of this 
issue see for example, Bertrand et al. (2000), Borjas (2005), Cutler and Glaeser (1997), Cutler et al. (2005), 
Edin et al (2003).  
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the host society into the picture, focusing on the degree of receptivity towards immigrants 
at a number of levels. These include government policy, civil society and individual 
attitudes, all of which are seen as culturally conditioned. One implication is that the 
outcomes for new immigrants depend largely on the degree of integration of the 
community as a whole and not just on the skills and motivation of the individual 
immigrant and the connections of his or her immediate friends and relatives.  
Much of the emphasis in the sociological literature has been placed on the 
strategies of ethnic communities, stretching back to opportunities that faced them when 
they first arrived (Portes and Rumbaut, 1996). This is seen in terms of immigrants’ access 
to different sectors and different occupational strata. As one study puts it “in a race-
conscious society such as ours, entire groups of people are ordered in terms of desirability 
for preferred jobs, with skill-relevant characteristics as additional weights” (Waldinger 
1996, p. 18). As a result, the early arrivals from a given source tend to be highly 
concentrated in certain occupational niches or in specific lines of small business—often 
related to particular ethnic goods. Thus in New York, Chinese immigrants were initially 
concentrated in laundries, restaurants and the garment sector. Over time the second 
generation immigrants and their newly arrived co-ethnics diversified into a wider range 
of occupations, partly through the extension of ethnic networks, partly though the 
adaptation of the communities themselves to the norms of the host society, and partly 
because they became less exceptional in the eyes of the host population. Even if they 
have somewhat different trajectories, ethnic groups with a deeper legacy should have a 
more positive effect on the assimilation experience of new immigrants—a theory that we 
seek to test in what follows.  
The stage of development of the ethnic community and its acceptance by the 
wider community is one factor that affects the outcomes for new immigrants. The other is 
the characteristics of the new immigrants themselves. One key element is the level of 
skills or education that the immigrant possesses. Immigrants with low skills and 
education are likely to be most dependent on what Portes and Rumbaut (1996, p. 84) call 
the ‘context of reception’, such that “the characteristics of the ethnic community acquire 
decisive importance in moulding their entry into the labor market and hence their 
prospects for future mobility” (1996, p. 86). By contrast, where immigrants are highly 
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educated, they are also likely to have good language skills and general human capital that 
is well adapted to the host country labour market. For these immigrants the ethnic context 
matters much less—a hypothesis that we investigate further below.  
 
Immigrant groups in the United States 
Until the late 19th century the vast majority of immigrants to the United States 
were from northwestern Europe. Immigrants from Britain, Ireland, Germany and 
Scandinavia accounted for 87 percent of the inflow from the 1820s up to 1880. From that 
time until the First World War the sources of immigration widened to southern and 
eastern Europe with large inflows from countries such as Italy, Poland, Russia and 
Austria-Hungary. These ‘new immigrants’ came from poorer countries and they were 
seen as distinctly different from the native-born and from previous immigrant groups. 
According to the US immigration Commission of 1911 the new immigration “was largely 
a movement of unskilled labouring men who have come, in large part temporarily, from 
the less progressive and advanced countries of Europe” and that, on the whole, they were 
“far less intelligent” and were “actuated by different ideals” than the old immigrants. In 
addition, they “have almost entirely avoided agricultural pursuits, and in the cities and 
industrial communities have congregated together in sections apart from native 
Americans and older immigrants to such an extent that assimilation has been slow as 
compared to that of earlier non-English speaking races” (US Immigration Commission, 
1911, Vol. 1, p. 14; see also Jenks and Lauck, 1926). 
 These views and those of other observers say as much about the prevailing 
attitudes towards these new and unfamiliar immigrants as they do about the immigrants 
themselves. Such attitudes added to the new immigrants’ disadvantage relative to 
immigrants from more traditional sources. As one observer puts it: 
Northwestern European migrants arriving after 1880 enjoyed certain advantages 
over [Southern, Central and Eastern Europeans] arriving at the same time because 
relatively few of the early settlers in the United States were of Southeastern 
European origin. Due to the previous waves from Northwestern Europe, later 
migrants from these sources found relatives and townspeople who had arrived 
earlier and were in a position to offer some help; a generally more favourable 
attitude on the part of the earlier settlers; the availability of ethnic institutions that 
provided services ranging from medical to recreational; and added employment 
opportunities available from established ethnic compatriots. Hence the fact that 
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many of the native whites were of the same ethnic origin as later immigrants from 
Northwestern Europe meant a generally easier situation for these immigrants 
around the turn of the century (Lieberson, 1980, p. 26/7). 
 
By the time the Immigration Commission reported, communities like the Italians 
and the Eastern European Jews had some thirty years of accumulated experience in the 
United States. Their growing social and economic integration is stressed in numerous 
accounts by social historians (Barton, 1975; Kessner, 1977; Bodnar, 1985). According to 
these accounts an important part of the process was individuals moving up the 
occupational ladder. But that process was also facilitated by the adaptation of these ethnic 
groups as communities and by a growing familiarity with, and acceptance of, them by 
native-born Americans. Econometric analysis (some of which uses the Immigration 
Commission’s own data) shows that the new immigrants suffered a substantial initial 
earnings disadvantage but they assimilated fairly rapidly towards the earnings levels of 
the native-born (Hatton 2000, Minns 2000). 
 In the years before the First World War new immigrant communities expanded. 
On the one hand they became better integrated and more widely accepted, but on the 
other hand inflows grew rapidly, embracing a widening range of source countries. Those 
trends were brought to a halt during the First World War and then by the imposition of 
country of origin quotas first introduced in 1921. Since the quotas were related to the 
historical stock of foreign born they bore down heavily on new immigrant countries. As a 
result the ratio of inflows to the existing stock fell to much lower levels right through 
until the 1960s. By that time the ethnic groups of Italians, Greeks, Poles, Russians and 
Romanians had become part of the fabric of American society. 
 The 1965 Amendments to the Immigration Act (effective in 1969) abolished the 
country of origin quotas in favour of quotas by hemisphere and subsequently a worldwide 
quota. As a result the opportunities for migration from non-traditional sources expanded 
dramatically. The share of new immigrants coming from Europe fell from 53 percent in 
the 1950s to 15 percent in the 1990s, while over the same period the share coming from 
Asia rose from 6 percent to 31 percent (Hatton and Williamson, 2005, p. 208). The share 
from Central and South America also increased in the 1950s and 1960s when there were 
no quotas for western hemisphere countries. Particularly notable is the share from 
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Mexico, which rose from 12 percent of the inflow in the 1950s to 25 percent in the 1990s. 
The effects of these trends on the stock of immigrants can be seen at a more 
disaggregated level in Table 1. This changing composition was accompanied by a gradual 
increase in the volume of the inflow from 2.5 million in the 1950s to 9 million in the 
1990s, which raised the foreign-born share to 11 percent of the population in 2000 from 
6.9 percent in 1950 and from only 4.7 percent in 1970.  
The new immigrants of the late 20th century shared many of the characteristics of 
the previous wave: they came from unfamiliar places, with unfamiliar languages and 
customs, and they were received with circumspection by the host community. Echoing 
the critics of immigration a century earlier Huntington has argued that American national 
identity is in a state of crisis because the latest waves are failing to assimilate:  
[S]ustained high-level immigration retards and can even obstruct assimilation. … 
the decline in the immigration of Irish and Germans after the Civil War and the 
drastic reduction in immigration of southern and eastern Europeans after 1924 
facilitated their assimilation into American society. If current levels of 
immigration are sustained, no such transfer of loyalties, convictions, and identities 
can be expected with Mexican immigrants, and the great American assimilation 
success story of the past will not necessarily be duplicated for Mexicans. (2004, p. 
229) 
 
Like the earlier wave, the new immigrants of the late 20th century came from 
much poorer countries with lower average skills and education. In the 1950s the average 
immigrant came from a country with a GDP per capita income 49 percent that of the US, 
whereas in the 1990s the average immigrant came from a country with a GDP per capita 
only 22 percent that of the US (Hatton and Williamson, 2006, p. 27). Just as in the late 
19th century, these trends were accompanied by a decline in the labour market 
performance of immigrants relative to the native born.3 Borjas (1999a, p. 1724) found 
that while immigrant males earned 4.1 percent more than native-born men in 1960, they 
earned 16.3 percent less in 1990. Some of this was due to the decline in immigrant 
educational attainment, but when this effect is eliminated, the adjusted relative wage still 
fell by 13.3 percentage points over these thirty years.  
                                                 
3 Between the 1860s and the 1900s the source country GDP per capita of the average immigrant fell from 
95 percent to 49 percent of US GDP per capita. As in the post-1950 period this was driven largely by the 
shift in origin country composition, and it was accompanied a decline in the average literacy rate of 
immigrants (despite rising literacy in source countries) and by a decline in their relative wage, which fell by 
5 percentage points between 1873 and 1913 (Hatton, 2000, p. 520).  
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These general findings are replicated in Table 2, which shows a sharp decline, 
especially in the 1970s and 1980s, in the ratio of the annual, weekly and hourly earnings 
of male immigrants relative to those of native-born men. The first line of the respective 
panels shows that between 1960 and 2000 these three relative earnings measures each 
decline by about 12 percentage points. But the second line in each panel shows what a 
difference the shift in composition makes. Here, the average earnings of the 16 immigrant 
groups listed in Table 1 are combined with fixed 1980 weights. The fixed weight ratios 
show no evidence of relative decline. In the absence of changes in the mix of immigrant 
origins, relative annual earnings increase by more than ten percentage points and relative 
hourly wages by nearly four percentage points.4 On these measures the economic 
performance of individual immigrant groups has been improving on average, even though 
it has worsened in aggregate. This and the foregoing discussion suggest that two forces 
have been at work. Looking at immigrants group-by-group, the newer immigrant groups 
have become better established and better accepted. But looking at all immigrants 
together, earnings assimilation has slowed due to compositional shifts (in particular, the 
significant increase in the share of immigrants coming from Mexico).   
 Clearly immigrants from different parts of the world bring different levels of 
skills and education with them as well as different cultures. But Figure 1 provides some 
indication that history might matter. It plots relative annual earnings for the 16 source 
region groups in Table 1 against the past stock of immigrants from that source divided by 
the current stock, for the three census years from 1980 to 2000. Here the past stock is the 
average number born in the source region as a share of the total population in the 
previous ten censuses, stretching back to the middle of the nineteenth century. The 
relationship is upward sloping although it is not a very good fit. The origin groups with 
long histories, including those that were the new immigrants of the late nineteenth 
century, have a rather better earnings performance than those with short histories. For 
those with relatively short histories but with much larger recent numbers, the relative 
                                                 
4 This is despite the increase over the period in the return to skills, which would tend to reduce immigrants’ 
earnings relative to the native-born (Smith, 2006, p. 213). In addition, the average years since migration, a 
variable normally associated with higher relative earnings, declined slightly between 1970 and 2000 for 
males with positive annual earnings. 
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wage is low. But such comparisons are crude and to see if history really matters we need 
to analyse the data more formally. 
 
An model of immigrant earnings 
Here we set out a simple model of demand for and supply of ethnic goods (or, 
alternatively, ethnic labour). We define the supply of ethnic goods, or direct labour 
services, for ethnic origin group g as:  
 
gggg MPS μα ++=          (1) 
 
where Pg can be thought of as the relative price of goods and services of a given quality 
supplied by ethnic origin group g to the rest of the community, Mg is the share of labour 
force represented by group g and μg is a group-specific component. The demand for the 
goods or services of ethnic origin group g is: 
 
ggggg ZYPD νβββ +++−= 321        (2) 
 
where Yg  is an ethnic capital effect, which depends on the average years since migration 
in the origin-region group, Zg is a demand shifter for the goods and services of ethnic 
origin group g, and νg is a group-specific component. Here, ethnic capital is the acquired 
ability to market ethnic labour services, which depends on the average number of years 
since migration for the ethnic origin group as a whole. The variable Zg captures the 
demand effect of the host society’s familiarity with, and acceptance of, the services 
offered by ethnic group g. (For example, Zg might be the extent of labor market 
discrimination against workers in group g.) Hence the price of ethnic goods is: 
 
11
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Following the standard earnings function, the log wage of the individual 
immigrant of education type i from ethnic group g depends on that individual’s 
characteristics as well as on the valuation of the services of the ethnic group as a whole. 
 
iggigigig PYXw εγγγγ ++++= 3210 1       (4) 
 
where Xig is the individual’s education, Yig is a function of the individual’s years since 
migration and εig is a random component. For non-immigrant workers the human capital 
earnings function (assuming the same underlying return to education) is: 
 
ininin Xw ηγδ ++= 10 1         
 (5) 
 
Thus the wage difference between immigrants and natives in education cell Xi can be 
expressed as: 
 
igig
gg
gggiginig ZMYYww ηεβα
μν
βα
βγ
βα
γ
βα
βγγδλ −++
−++++−+++−=− 11
33
1
3
1
23
200 )(  
(6) 
 
The wage gap between immigrants and natives in a given education group should 
be a positive function of the immigrant’s years since migration (γ2 > 0) and of years since 
migration for the group as a whole (γ3β2/(α+β1) > 0). It should be a negative function of 
the total number of immigrants from the ethnic origin group (γ3/(α+β1) > 0) and a 
positive function of the familiarity of the native population with that particular ethnic 
group (γ3β3/(α+β1) > 0). There are both group-specific and individual-specific error 
terms.  
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Estimates of earnings and hours from the US Census 
We use the 5 percent US census samples for 1980, 1990 and 2000 in order to 
estimate equations for annual hours and earnings for males.5 The estimating equation is: 
 
ijgtjitgtgtgtgtijgtijgt
ijnt
ijgt edddUaZaMaYaYaYaa
W
W
ln ++++++++++=⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
6543
2
210   
 
We define variables for the ‘pseudo-person’ as the mean for a given education group (i) 
by age group (j) by ethnicity group (g) at each census (t). There are four education 
groups, eight age groups and 16 different origin-regions (see Appendix for definitions). 
The left hand side of the equation is the ratio of an outcome variable for immigrants from 
a given origin (g) relative to that for native-born workers (n) of the same education/age 
group in the same year. Yijgt is the pseudo-person’s years since migration and Ygt is the 
average years since migration for the origin group as a whole. Mgt is the total number of 
foreign-born from the origin-region at time t, as a proportion of the total population. The 
variable Zgt is our measure of the historical presence of an origin group. For this we 
calculate the average number of foreign-born from the origin-region enumerated in 
previous censuses stretching back 120 years. This is a measure of how embedded in 
American society are the traditions of immigrants from each origin-region.  
The measure of immigration history could also capture the fact that early 
immigrants came from countries that were (and still are) relatively developed. Thus we 
also include in Ugt origin region characteristics that influence the selection and 
performance of immigrants in the US. We include the ratio of GDP per capita in the 
origin region to the US lagged 10 years and the ratio of average years of education in the 
origin region relative to the US lagged 10 years (the 10 year lag aims to capture the 
conditions in the migrant’s home country at the time he migrated to the US). Higher 
source region GDP for a given level of education reflects specific skills and technology in 
the source population that are not fully reflected in average education and that appear as 
higher unobserved labour market quality. We therefore expect a positive sign on the GDP 
                                                 
5 We opt not to use the samples for 1970 and earlier because (a) they are only a 1 percent sample, and (b) 
the hours worked per week variable is defined differently than in the 1980-2000 samples, raising possible 
issues of consistency. 
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per capita ratio and a negative sign on the education years ratio. The selection process of 
immigrants from a given origin has been analysed using the Roy model (Borjas 1987, 
1999a); the greater the return to skill in the source country relative to the destination 
country, the more immigrants will be negatively selected. We proxy the relative return to 
skill by the ratio of origin-region inequality to US inequality, and we expect the sign to be 
negative. Selection is also likely to be more positive the higher are migration costs, and 
we attempt to capture this effect by the log of the distance between Chicago and the most 
important city in the origin region. Sources of these data are detailed in the Appendix. 
Finally, we also include dummies di, dj, dt for education group, age group and year, 
although these are not reported in the tables of results. Given that most of the variation in 
the origin-specific variables Zgt and Ugt is in the cross section we do not include origin 
fixed effects. 
  The results of this basic specification are shown in Table 3. In the first column the 
outcome variable is the log ratio of annual earnings. The number of years since migration 
and its square give positive and negative coefficients respectively, consistent with the 
results from studies of individual-level data. The second and third columns show that 
years since migration has smaller and weaker effects for hourly wages and for hours 
worked. By contrast the coefficient on origin-specific average years since migration is not 
significant. Origin-region characteristics turn out to be important in all three regressions. 
The coefficients on the foreign to US GDP ratio are positive and those on the education 
ratio are negative as expected. This strongly supports the view that high origin income 
relative to education captures source-specific labour market quality. The ratio of the 
average gini coefficient in the origin-region relative to that of the US takes a negative 
coefficient, consistent with the predictions of the Roy model.  The effect of distance turns 
out to be unimportant in the presence of these other origin-region variables.  
As predicted, the current stock of immigrants has a negative impact on relative 
annual earnings, due to the crowding effect. But we also find that this effect is non-
linear—becoming less negative at higher levels of the origin-specific immigrant stock. 
Most important for our purposes is the average stock of immigrants from the origin-
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region over the previous 120 years.6 This is a measure of the extent to which the past 
history of origin-specific immigration matters. Following the argument above that past 
history matters less for the most highly educated immigrants, we also include an 
interaction of the past immigrant stock with a dummy for the high education group (those 
with 4 or more years of college). For annual earnings and hourly wages the main effect is 
strongly positive while the interaction effect is negative with a slightly smaller coefficient 
for annual earnings. This supports the view that past immigration history matters far less 
for highly educated immigrants because they are more able to transcend ethic barriers.   
The migrant stock effects can be illustrated by comparing one of the oldest 
immigrant sources, Britain and Ireland, with one of the newest, Mexico, in 1990. The 
contribution of the current stock is to reduce the annual earnings of Mexican immigrants 
by 11.5 percent relative to those from Britain and Ireland, while the past stock effect 
(including the interaction with high education) reduces the earnings of Mexicans by 11.2 
percent relative to those of the British.  Similarly, compared with immigrants from 
Southern Europe, the earnings of Mexicans are reduced by 10.5 percent through the 
current stock effect and by 3.3 percent through the past stock effect.  These sizable effects 
suggest that Mexicans suffer the double disadvantage of being very numerous in the 
present but much less numerous in the past. Borjas and Katz (2005) have noted that the 
share of Mexican immigrants in the US workforce declined steadily from the 1920s to the 
1960s. Our results suggest that this decline may have had an adverse impact on the labour 
market outcomes of today’s Mexican immigrants. 
 
Alternative estimates  
Here we examine two variants of the estimates in Table 3 in order to check the 
robustness of the results. Because the variables representing the past history of 
immigration and other origin-specific variables have relatively little time series variation, 
Table 3 did not include origin-specific effects. Thus the immigrant stock effects may be 
capturing unobserved immigrant qualities that happen to be correlated with the timing 
                                                 
6 Thus for an observation from 1980 the variable measures the average share of the immigrant group in the 
population at census years from 1860 to 1970, excluding 1890 and 1930 for which the census records are 
missing. For a year 2000 observation the variable measures the average stock over the census years 1880 to 
1990.  
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and magnitude of past migrations but are not fully captured by origin-region variables 
like GDP per capita or education. Estimates of annual earnings and hourly wages using 
GLS random effects and fixed effects regressions are presented in Table 4.7 A Hausman 
test indicates that random effects is not rejected against fixed effects at the 5 percent level 
for relative annual earnings and at the 10 percent level for relative hourly wages.  
The main difference in these results as compared with those in Table 3 is that the 
origin-region characteristics become statistically insignificant. Origin specific effects 
absorb the effects that were previously captured by the GDP ratio, the education years 
ratio and the gini coefficient ratio. By contrast the immigrant stock effects are relatively 
robust—indeed the coefficients of the current immigrant stock and its square are 
substantially larger. The past stock effects are little altered in magnitude although they 
are reduced in significance as might be expected, as most of the variation is across origin 
regions rather than over time. We conclude that the effect of the past immigrant stock is 
not simply a spurious result arising from the omission of origin-region fixed effects. 
A second question is whether it is immigration in the recent past or in the distant 
past that influences the earnings assimilation of current immigrants. Table 5 presents 
different versions of the annual earnings equation in which immigration history is 
captured by the migrant stock at different times in the past. For comparison with Table 3 
these regressions do not include origin-specific effects. The first equation includes the 
immigrant stock 120 years previous to the current census (thus for immigrants observed 
in 1980 the past stock is that in 1860). This produces a positive coefficient that is highly 
significant while the interaction with high education is negative but much smaller. The 
coefficients on the stock 70 years ago in the second column and on the stock 30 years ago 
in the third column follow a similar pattern. It is notable that the main effect increases in 
size as the past stock becomes closer to the present, but the offsetting effect of high 
education becomes even greater. Thus recent immigration history is more important than 
that of the distant past, especially for immigrants with less than college education.  For 
example Mexicans were 1.0 percent of the population in 1980 and 3.2 percent in 2000. 
Over that period the increase in the current stock reduced Mexican earnings by 4.1 
percent while the past stock (30 years ago) increased relative earnings by only 0.6 
                                                 
7 Since distance varies only by origin-region it is eliminated from these regressions.  
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percent. Out-of-sample projections suggest that the past stock effect will become much 
stronger in the future; between 2000 and 2020 the past stock (30 years earlier) should 
raise Mexican earnings by 9.8 percent.  
 An alternative measure of the degree of familiarity with certain ethnic origins is 
the proportion claiming ancestry from a particular source region. This is based on the first 
ancestry that was listed, and the base population is the native-born aged 15 and over who 
listed at least one country of ancestry. However, claiming certain ancestries is a choice 
that may depend on the individual’s income or labour market status and we therefore 
instrument the ancestry variable using the past stock measure that appeared in Tables 3 
and 4. The result in the last column of Table 5 shows that the main effect gives a highly 
significant positive coefficient for annual earnings while the interaction largely offsets 
this effect for the highly educated. This result provides further support for the idea that 
immigration traditions matter for the economic outcomes of current immigrants. To give 
an idea of the magnitudes, shifting from the proportion who claim British ancestry to the 
proportion who claim Mexican ancestry would reduce the relative annual earnings of an 
immigrant group in 1990 by about 13 percent.  
  
Analysis by census division in the United States.  
The concentration of immigrants both past and present varies widely across 
different parts of the United States. For example, in 1990 Mexicans were 68 per thousand 
of the population in the Pacific division but they were less than one per thousand of New 
England’s population; by contrast the figures for immigrants from southern Europe were 
4 per thousand in the Pacific division and 18 per thousand in New England. Thus the 
labour market outcomes for an immigrant may depend on current and past immigrant 
concentrations in their particular location, but these effects will not necessarily be the 
same as those estimated at the national level. If the performance of immigrants is shaped 
by attitudes and norms that are formed at the national level then estimates across US 
regions will not fully reflect these national effects.  
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Here we follow the same approach as previously, but we disaggregate the data 
into the nine census divisions that represent broad geographic regions in the US.8 The 
estimating equation is re-written (with subscript r for US census division) as:  
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Thus, allowing for missing cases, we have more than eight times as many observations 
and we include fixed effects for US division and immigrant origin. The dependent 
variables and years since migration now vary across the four education groups (i), eight 
age groups (j), nine census divisions (r), 16 origin groups (g), and three census years (t). 
The immigrant stock variables and group years since migration vary across division, 
origin and year; and the distance variable is now calculated separately for each division.   
This approach has advantages and disadvantages over the national-level data used 
previously. The advantage is that we can exploit geographic variation in the concentration 
of immigrants from different origins.  One disadvantage is possible endogeneity due to 
migration across census divisions, an issue that has been raised in the context of 
measuring the effect of immigration on native wages (Borjas 2003). We minimise this 
problem by estimating across census divisions rather than across states or cities, thus 
reducing the cross border effect.9  Division-level analysis also avoids too much reduction 
in the cell sizes when calculating the current and past immigrant stocks. But, as noted 
above, if there is a national component to effects of current and past immigrant stocks 
then these will not be captured by division-level analysis.  
 The first two columns in Table 6 include dummies for origin-region and exclude 
variables that have no variation across US census divisions. Not surprisingly, the effects 
                                                 
8 The US Census Bureau defines the nine census divisions as the New England Division (CT, ME, MA, 
NH, RI, VT), the Middle Atlantic Division (NJ, NY, PA), the East North Central Division (IL, IN, MI, OH, 
WI), the West North Central Division (IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD), the South Atlantic Division (DE, 
DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV), the East South Central Division (AL, KY, MS, TN), the West South 
Central Division (AR, LA, OK, TX), the Mountain Division (AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY), and 
the Pacific Division (AK, CA, HI, OR and WA).  
9 Note that if immigrants’ location decisions depend on their relative wage then the endogeneity relates 
principally to the current immigrant stock, M, rather than to the past stock, Z, which can be reasonably 
assumed to be exogenous. While Z might be a natural instrument for M, we cannot use it here because it 
appears directly in the structural equation.  
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of years since migration and its square and origin-group average years since migration are 
similar to those in Tables 3 and 4. But the current and past stock effects are much smaller. 
For annual earnings the main effect of the past immigrant stock is one third the size of 
that in Table 3, and the interaction with high education is reduced by about half. This 
difference in the coefficients could arise either because the immigrant stock coefficients 
are biased upwards in the absence of origin region fixed effects, or it could be because 
division-level variables do not capture national-level effects. In order to investigate this, 
the third and fourth columns of Table 6 include the GDP per capita ratio, the education 
years ratio and the gini coefficient ratio but exclude the origin-region dummies. These 
additional variables give coefficients that are very similar in magnitude to those in the 
national-level regression in Table 3. But the coefficients on the current and past 
immigrant stock variables are very little changed in this alternative specification, as 
compared with the first two columns. We therefore conclude that there is a distinct 
difference between the immigrant stock effects at the national- and division-levels, which 
is not simply due to the presence or absence of origin-region fixed effects.   
The immigrant stock variables now explain less of the annual earnings difference 
in 1990 between immigrants from Mexico and those from the UK. Using the weighted 
means across divisions, the current stock effect lowers Mexican earnings relative to the 
British and Irish by 1.6 percent and the past stock effect lowers them by a further 3.8 
percent. More appropriately, we can examine the spatial differences. For Mexicans in 
1990, relative earnings are predicted to be 5.4 percent lower in the Pacific division than in 
the Mid-Atlantic due to the current stock effect but 3.2 percent higher due to the past 
stock effect. For other groups that are more evenly distributed, the interregional effects 
are smaller. For Southern Europeans, between the Pacific and the Mid Atlantic, the 
current stock effect is +1.7 percent while the past stock effect is -1.7 percent; for the 
British and Irish these effects are +0.1 percent and -1.4 percent respectively.    
Table 7 shows the effect of different measures of past immigration history. Again 
the coefficients on the past immigrant stock and its interaction with high education are 
considerably smaller than in the comparable regressions in Table 5. This reinforces the 
conclusion that to some degree the receptiveness to different immigrant groups by origin-
region operates at the national level rather than at the local or regional level within the 
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US. In the first three columns the coefficients on the main effect of the past immigrant 
stock remains fairly stable as the past stock becomes closer to the present, but as in the 
national level estimates, the interaction effect becomes larger the more recent the 
immigrant stock. Finally the ancestry variable, which is instrumented as before, gives a 
coefficient that is very similar to that in the national-level estimates of Table 5.  
 
Immigrant integration and host country attitudes 
The evidence for earnings suggests that—relative to non-immigrant Americans— 
immigrants from origin-regions that have a long immigration history do better in the 
labour market than those with shorter histories but larger current numbers. The 
interpretation that we have given to this is that these immigrants are more readily 
accepted because their cultures are more familiar and have, to some degree, become part 
of the mainstream culture. But does this really reflect the degree of integration of 
different ethnic communities or is it simply the result of other unobserved characteristics 
that happen to be correlated with immigration histories? In this section we briefly review 
other indicators of the degree of integration and acceptance of immigrants by origin.  
Intermarriage between immigrants and native-born Americans has often been 
regarded as a key indicator of social integration (Kalmijn, 1998).10 Thus “intermarriage 
across racial or ethnic lines is considered a litmus test of assimilation because it affirms 
the dissolving of cultural barriers to the formation of intimate relationships between 
members of socially or culturally distinct groups” (Bean and Stevens, 2003, p. 175). 
Table 8 lists the proportion of married immigrants aged 20-39 in 1980 who were married 
to a native-born American and who married after arrival in the US.11 As others have 
noted the rate of intermarriage is much higher among ‘old’ than among ‘new’ immigrant 
groups (Lieberson and Waters, 1990). The correlation across these origin groups between 
the ratio of the average past stock to current stock, displayed in the third column, and the 
rate of intermarriage is 0.80.  
                                                 
10 The intermarriage literature, motivated by concerns about the assimilation of new ethnic groups, dates 
back at least to Drachsler (1920).  
11 We use census data from 1980 because this is the most recent year for which we can calculate both the 
date at which the individual first married and the period when he or she arrived in the US.  
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Intermarriage rates are consistent with the idea that immigrants with a long 
tradition behind them are more readily accepted because their cultures are more familiar 
and have, to some degree, become part of the mainstream culture. But it could 
nevertheless be argued that immigrants from non-traditional sources are simply less 
willing to intermarry, perhaps because of differences in religious beliefs. Thus the 
evidence from intermarriage may reflect the preferences of immigrants rather than those 
of the host society. 12 One measure of immigrants’ social assimilation, which does not 
rely on the cooperation of others, is the proportion who take out citizenship. The second 
column of Table 8 shows the proportion of the same base group who had become 
citizens. This has a much lower correlation (0.30) with the ratio of past stock to present 
stock. It suggests that intermarriage largely reflects the preferences of natives rather than 
those of immigrants, but this is at best a very indirect inference.  
What direct evidence is there on the views of Americans about different types of 
immigrants by source region? While there are many surveys that ask respondents about 
their attitudes towards immigrants in general, relatively few elicit attitudes to immigrants 
by detailed origin country or region. A Roper survey of 1982 contains a question about 
immigrants from 13 different origin countries, some of which have long immigration 
traditions stretching back to the nineteenth century. The survey asked whether 
immigrants from a given source had on balance been a good thing or a bad thing for the 
United States and the figure reported in Table 9 is the difference between the numbers 
who responded ‘good’ and the number who responded ‘bad’ as a percentage of all 
respondents.13 Thus, for example, 53 percent of respondents thought that Polish 
immigrants had on balance, been ‘good’ while 12 percent thought they had been ‘bad’, 
with the remainder responding either ‘mixed feelings’ or ‘don’t know’. 
If we can interpret these figures as a measure of the overall approval rating of 
immigrants from different sources then a clear hierarchy emerges, with the more 
traditional immigrant origins receiving the highest approval ratings. This ranking can be 
                                                 
12 On the links between religion, ethnicity and cultural assimilation see Bisin et al. (2004). Empirical 
studies of intermarriage include Kantarevic (2004) and Meng and Gregory (2005).  
13 The question was phrased as follows: “Since the beginning of our country, people of many different 
religions, races and nationalities have come here and settled. Here is a list of some different groups. Would 
you read down the list and, thinking of what they have contributed to this country and what they have 
gotten from this country, for each one tell me whether you think on balance, they have been a good thing or 
a bad thing for this country.” (Lynch and Simon, 2003, p. 44-5).  
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compared with the ratio of the immigrant stock in the past relative to that in the present, 
as a reflection of the past history of immigration. While the ranking is not exact there is a 
clear positive correlation between the approval ratings and the ratios of past to present 
immigrant stocks. The correlation coefficient between the 1982 approval rating and the 
1910/1980 stock ratio is 0.61, and the correlation between the approval rating and the 
1950/1980 stock ratio is 0.74. Two further opinion polls conducted for USA Today and 
CNN in 1985 and 1993 asked whether immigrants from the sources listed had “generally 
benefited the country or generally created problems for the country”. Here the list of 
countries is shorter but the rankings are fairly similar. It is tempting to suggest that the 
decline in the approval rating for Mexicans reflects the steep rise across the 1980s in the 
current stock relative to the past stock. However, it is hazardous to infer very much about 
changes over time from these relatively small samples.  
 Evidence such as that in Table 9 is largely circumstantial, and it could reflect a 
host of things other than the degree to which Americans are willing to trust, do business 
with, employ, or engage in other ways with different immigrant groups. And there 
remains the doubt that these rankings are conditioned largely on racial stereotypes rather 
than being a reflection of immigration traditions. In 1997 a Knight-Ridder survey on 
attitudes towards immigrants asked questions specifically about recent immigrants 
(meaning those arriving since 1980). Respondents were asked for opinions towards 
different origin groups on a scale of one (very unfavourable) to 10 (very favourable). The 
results in the first column of Table 10 indicate that while European immigrants were the 
most favourably regarded, others such as Africans and Japanese also scored highly, and 
the differences across groups were relatively small. The second column reports on a scale 
of one to 10 the respondent’s perception of the way that these groups are portrayed in the 
media. This gives a somewhat wider range with a ranking a little more similar to that in 
the previous table. One interpretation of these results is that while individuals see 
themselves as relatively unbiased, they see society as a whole as rather more 
unfavourable to groups such as Mexicans and Cubans who scored low in the polls 
reported in Table 9.  
 One reason for thinking this is reported in the third column of Table 10. 
Respondents were asked if they had friends who were recent immigrants from up to three 
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of the origin groups listed. They were also asked if immigrants from up to three origin 
groups were living nearby. The third column of Table 9 reports the ratio of the number 
who replied that they had friends from a particular origin divided by the number that 
reported having neighbours from that origin.  This can be interpreted as the number of 
close contacts divided by the opportunity for such contacts. This ratio is much lower for 
Mexico, Cuba, India and China than for Africa, Europe the Middle East and other 
Caribbean. While the ranking does not correspond particularly closely with the past to 
present immigrant stock ratio in the final column, neither does it correspond very closely 
with the column on favourable or unfavourable opinion. Thus while Americans do not 
seem to be particularly prejudiced against some origin groups relative to others, there are 
distinct differences in the degree to which they interact with these different groups.  
 
Conclusion  
The earliest accounts of immigrant assimilation argued that America was a 
melting pot in which immigrants with different cultures and from different parts of the 
world were absorbed into the mainstream within a couple of generations. While each new 
wave of unfamiliar faces from unfamiliar places tended to be received with suspicion and 
with some degree of prejudice, over time they became accepted and integrated into the 
US labour market. The more recent literature has cast doubt on the melting pot view, 
arguing that waves of immigrants from different origins have unique histories that trace 
out very different trajectories of assimilation and integration. What they do agree on 
however is that patterns of assimilation in general, and labour market outcomes in 
particular, depend on the interactions between immigrant communities and the host 
society and not solely on the characteristics and the motivation of immigrants as 
individuals. This in turn suggests that the economic outcomes for current immigrants 
depend on the size of the immigrant community both in the present and in the past. 
 In this paper we have attempted to capture these forces by including the size of 
origin-specific immigrant communities in the present and in the past as explanatory 
variables for relative earnings. Our results support the view that a large numbers of 
immigrants from a given origin tends to depress relative earnings while a history of past 
immigration from that source raises relative earnings. Thus just as the surge of Southern 
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and Eastern European migrants to the US put downward pressure on their countrymen’s 
wages in the period up to the First World War, the more recent waves from Asia and 
particularly from Mexico have had a similar effect. But as the past stock of Southern and 
Eastern Europeans increased relative to the current stock, so their economic outcomes 
improved. Something similar is now happening to immigrants from countries whose 
share of the US migrant stock is increasing.  
Although the relative earnings of immigrants to the US have fallen since the 
1960s, this is largely because of the shift in the composition towards immigrants from 
origin regions with little past history. As the surge of new immigrants has continued, the 
ratio of past stock to current stock has been increasing for most origin regions. This has 
contributed to the rise in the relative earnings of immigrants when the source region 
composition is held constant.14 On the one hand this suggests that the melting pot still 
works: as the new immigrants of recent years accumulate longer histories their outcomes 
will continue to improve. On the other hand our results suggest that the assimilation 
process may take rather a long time.  
                                                 
14 Between 1970 and 2000 the ratio of past average stock to current immigrant stock, taking an unweighted 
average across the 16 origin groups, increased from 1.1 to 2.6. If instead we weight these ratios by the 
current immigrant stock then the average falls from 2.3 in 1970 to 0.8 in 2000.  
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Table 1  
Source Composition of US Immigrant Stock 
(percent of foreign born) 
 
Source Region 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Mexico 7.0 6.7 9.5 17.0 23.4 30.3 
Central America 0.4 0.7 1.3 2.9 5.8 6.5 
Caribbean: 1.4 2.2 7.5 9.8 9.3 9.1 
South America 0.5 1.0 3.0 4.6 5.5 6.0 
Scandinavia 6.5 6.0 3.7 1.7 1.0 0.5 
UK & Ireland 13.7 13.3 11.3 7.2 5.0 3.2 
Western Europe 3.4 3.9 4.0 2.7 1.9 1.3 
Southern Europe 20.9 17.9 15.5 10.8 6.0 3.6 
Central/Eastern Europe 31.1 31.9 26.6 16.6 10.9 7.6 
Russian Empire 11.1 10.1 6.3 3.9 2.0 2.8 
East Asia 1.4 2.6 4.8 8.3 10.1 9.1 
Southeast Asia 0.6 1.3 2.3 7.4 10.7 10.0 
India/Southwest Asia 0.1 0.4 1.2 3.1 4.2 5.4 
Middle East/Asia Minor 1.4 1.3 1.6 2.1 2.1 1.8 
Africa 0.2 0.3 0.9 1.6 1.7 2.6 
Australia & New Zealand 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 
Total (sources listed) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: Calculated from census birthplace statistics taken from IPUMS at: 
http://www.ipums.umn.edu/usa/person.html#pethnicity. Totals exclude those born in Canada, in Puerto 
Rico, and where birthplace is not known or is too broadly defined.  
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Table 2 
Immigrant/Native-born Earnings Ratios, Males 1960-2000 
 
Year 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
 Annual Earnings Ratio (Immigrant/Native-born) 
Actual immigrant weights 96.1 96.9 89.3 85.2 83.8 
Fixed 1980 weights 83.2 89.8 89.3 90.8 93.5 
 Weekly Earnings (Immigrant/Native-born) 
Actual immigrant weights 98.6 99.4 91.5 88.4 86.9 
Fixed 1980 weights 87.0 93.0 91.5 93.4 95.8 
 Hourly Wages (Immigrant/Native-born) 
Actual immigrant weights 101.7 102.6 94.0 90.5 89.7 
Fixed 1980 weights 93.5 96.8 94.0 95.3 97.3 
 
Notes: These are based on annual wage and salary income for males aged 25-64 for whom income is non-
zero. Weekly earnings are derived as annual earnings divided by weeks worked in the past year and hourly 
wages are derived as weekly earnings divided by usual hours, for 1980, 1990 and 2000 and by hours last 
week for 1960 and 1970.  
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Table 3 
Estimates for Relative Annual Earnings, Hourly Wages and Hours Worked 
 
Dependent Variable Annual 
Income Hourly Wage Hours worked 
Years since migration/100 (i,j,g,t) 0.314 0.133 0.067 
 [5.5] [3.3] [2.8] 
Years since migration squared /100 (i,j,g,t) -0.035 -0.010 -0.011 
 [3.4] [1.4] [2.4] 
Group years since migration /10  (g,t) -0.023 0.018 0.019 
 [0.7] [0.7] [1.2] 
Immigrant stock per 100 population (g,t) -0.160 -0.130 -0.013 
 [5.5] [5.5] [1.0] 
Immigrant stock per 100 population squared (g,t) 0.036 0.032 0.003 
 [7.7] [3.9] [1.0] 
Past stock per 100 population (g,t) 0.069 0.032 0.003 
 [8.1] [4.1] [1.8] 
Past stock × high education (g,t) -0.045 -0.035 0.003 
 [4.3] [4.0] [1.1] 
GDP ratio (foreign/US) (g,t-1) 0.364 0.169 0.077 
 [7.2] [4.8] [3.6] 
Education years ratio (foreign/US) (g, t-1) -0.302 -0.178 -0.077 
 [4.6] [3.4] [3.4] 
Gini coefficient ratio (foreign/US) (g, t-1) -0.182 -0.156 -0.038 
 [4.1] [5.0] [2.2] 
Log distance (g) 0.003 0.005 0.007 
 [0.2] [0.6] [1.8] 
 R2 0.66 0.44 0.47 
No of observations 1536 1536 1536 
 
Note: Regressions include dummies (not reported) for 8 age groups, 4 education groups and 3 census years. 
The data are weighted according to the number of cases underlying each observation; the ‘t’ statistics are 
computed from robust standard errors.   
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Table 4 
Random Effects and Fixed Effects Estimates of Relative Earnings 
 
Dependent Variable Annual Earnings Hourly Wage 
Estimating Method RE FE RE FE 
Years since migration/10 (i,j,g,t) 0.364 0.361 0.079 0.081 
 [9.9] [9.7] [2.0] [2.0] 
Years since migration squared /100 (i,j,g,t) -0.051 -0.050 -0.001 -0,001 
 [7.0] [6.8] [0.1] [0.2] 
Group years since migration /10  (g,t) 0.029 0.033 0.040 0.088 
 [0.9] [0.9] [1.2] [2.3] 
Immigrant stock per 100 population (g,t) -0.323 -0.341 -0.269 -0.273 
 [5.9] [4.7] [5.4] [3.5] 
Immigrant stock per 100 population squared (g,t) 0.064 0.064 0.051 0.057 
 [4.6] [4.0] [3.9] [3.3] 
Past stock per 100 population (g,t) 0.060 0.074 0.051 0.089 
 [2.5] [1.9] [2.9] [2.1] 
Past stock per 100 × high education (g,t) -0.038 -0.038 -0.031 -0.030 
 [3.3] [3.3] [2.4] [2.4] 
GDP ratio (foreign/US) (g,t-1) 0.164 -0.175 0.129 -0.030 
 [1.5] [0.9] [1.5] [0.1] 
Education years ratio (foreign/US) (g,t-1) 0.028 0.099 -0.060 -0.287 
 [0.2] [0.5] [0.7] [1.4] 
Gini coefficient ratio (foreign/US) (g,t-1) 0.038 0.054 0.016 0.130 
 [0.5] [0.6] [0.3] [1.4] 
R2     Within 0.32 0.32 0.09 0.09 
         Between 0.89 0.74 0.89 0.41 
         Overall 0.58 0.49 0.32 0.18 
Hausmann test (χ2) 7.55  13.1  
No of observations 1536 1536 1536 1536 
 
Note: Regressions include dummies (not reported) for 8 age groups, 4 education groups and 3 census years. 
‘z’ statistics are in parentheses.  
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Table 5 
Annual Earnings Estimates with Different Past Stocks  
 
Dependent Variable Annual 
Earnings 
Annual 
Earnings 
Annual 
Earnings 
Annual 
Earnings 
Years since migration/10 (i,j,g,t) 0.327 0.316 0.314 0.306 
 [5.7] [5.5] [5.6] [5.4] 
Years since migration  squared /100 (i,j,g,t) -0.035 -0.037 -0.034 -0.033 
 [3.4] [3.5] [3.3] [3.3] 
Group years since migration /10  (g,t) 0.020 -0.038 -0.023 0.0003 
 [0.6] [1.0] [0.6] [0.01] 
Immigrant stock per 100 population (g,t) -0.147 -0.154 -0.157 -0.162 
 [5.01] [5.4] [5.3] [5.5] 
Immigrant stock per 100 population squared (g,t) 0.036 0.035 0.033 0.029 
 [4.2] [4.2] [4.0] [5.8] 
Stock per 100 population 120 years ago (g,t) 0.024    
 [7.1]    
Stock 120 years ago × high education (g,t) -0.014    
 [2.8]    
Stock per 100 population 70 years ago (g,t)  0.052   
  [6.2]   
Stock 70 years ago × high education (g,t)  -0.036   
  [4.3]   
Stock per 100 population 30 years ago (g,t)   0.107  
   [4.49]  
Stock 30 years ago × high education (g,t)   -0.126  
   [4.8]  
Percent of population with group ancestry (g,t)    0.009 
    [5.6] 
Group ancestry × high education (g,t)    -0.007 
    [4.3] 
GDP ratio (foreign/US) (g, t-1) 0.292 0.394 0.347 0.294 
 [5.8] [7.3] [6.28] [7.8] 
Education years ratio (foreign/US) (g, t-1) -0.242 -0.305 -0.201 -0.237 
 [4.0] [4.1] [3.0] [3.9] 
Gini coefficient ratio (foreign/US) (g, t-1) -0.183 -0.199 -0.214 -0.168 
 [4.0] [4.5] [4.8] [3.8] 
Log distance (g) 0.09 -0.010 -0.010 0.007 
 [0.8] [0.9] [0.8] [0.06] 
R2  0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 
No of observations 1536 1536 1536 1536 
 
Note: Regressions include dummies (not reported) for 8 age groups, 4 education groups and 3 census years. 
The data are weighted according to the number of cases underlying each observation; the ‘t’ statistics are 
computed from robust standard errors. In the last column ancestry is instrumented using average past stock.  
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Table 6 
Estimates for Relative Earnings at Census Division level with and without Origin-
Region Effects 
 
Dependent Variable Annual 
Earnings 
Hourly 
Wage 
Annual 
Earnings 
Hourly 
Wage 
Years since migration/10 (i,j,r,g,t) 0.271 0.122 0.297 0.118 
 [10.92] [5.43] [11.45] [5.2] 
Years since migration squared /100 (i,j,r,g,t) -0.029 -0.006 -0.033 -0.008 
 [5.8] [1.4] [6.3] [1.9] 
Group years since migration /10  (r,g,t) 0.028 0.020 -0.009 0.026 
 [1.6] [1.2] [0.6] [2.0] 
Immigrant stock per 100 population (r,g,t) -0.024 -0.021 -0.040 -0.019 
 [2.7] [3.7] [5.8] [3.3] 
Immigrant stock per 100 popn. squared (r,g,t) 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 
 [2.5] [2.5] [4.6] [1.9] 
Past stock per 100 population (r,g,t) 0.023 0.011 0.025 0.010 
 [7.5] [3.7] [9.2] [4.1] 
Past stock per 100 × high education (r,g,t) -0.018 -0.017 -0.021 -0.019 
 [4.7] [4.8] [5.5] [5.3] 
GDP ratio (foreign/US) (g, t-1)   0.358 0.190 
   [16.38] [9.2] 
Education years ratio (foreign/US) (g, t-1)   -0.263 -0.204 
   [8.0] [6.7] 
Gini coefficient ratio (foreign/US) (g, t-1)   -0.215 -0.192 
   [8.6] [9.2] 
Log distance (r,g) 0.029 -0.063 -0.008 -0.002 
 [1.0] [2.5] [0.95] [0.2] 
Dummies for region of origin  Yes Yes No No 
R2  0.48 0.30 0.45 0.27 
No of observations 12542 12541 12542 12541 
 
Note: Regressions include dummies (not reported) for 8 age groups, 4 education groups, 16 regions of 
origin (first two columns only) ,9 census divisions and 3 census years. The data are weighted according to 
the number of cases underlying each observation; the ‘t’ statistics are computed from robust standard 
errors. 
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Table 7 
The Effect of Different Past Stocks at Census Division level with Origin-Region 
Effects 
 
Dependent Variable Annual 
Earnings 
Annual 
Earnings 
Annual 
Earnings 
Annual 
Earnings 
Years since migration/10 (i,j,r,g,t) 0.277 0.267 0.269 0.261 
 [11.1] [10.8] [10.9] [10.5] 
Years since migration  squared /100 (i,j,r,g,t) -0.030 -0.028 -0.029 -0.027 
 [5.9] [5.6] [5.9] [5.4] 
Group years since migration /10  (r,g,t) 0.034 0.034 0.036 0.027 
 [1.9] [1.9] [2.0] [1.5] 
Immigrant stock per 100 population (r,g,t) -0.023 -0.020 -0.019 -0.036 
 [2.7] [2.4] [2.1] [3.6] 
Immigrant stock per 100 popn. squared (r,g,t) 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 [3.1] [1.9] [2.1] [2.5] 
Stock per 100 population 120 years ago (r,g,t) 0.011    
 [6.5]    
Stock 120 years ago × high education (r,g,t) -0.001    
 [0.75]    
Stock per 100 population 70 years ago (r,g,t)  0.018   
  [8.1]   
Stock 70 years ago × high education (r,g,t)  -0.018   
  [5.9]   
Stock per 100 population 30 years ago (r,g,t)   0.015  
   [2.4]  
Stock 30 years ago × high education (r,g,t)   -0.063  
   [6.8]  
Percent of population with group ancestry (r,g,t)    0.009 
    [6.1] 
Group ancestry × high education (r,g,t)    -0.004 
    [3.9] 
Log distance (r)  0.024 0.039 0.002 0.042 
 [0.8] [1.4] [0.1] [1.4] 
R2  0.48 0.48 0.48 0.47 
No of observations 12542 12542 12542 12542 
 
Note: Regressions include dummies (not reported) for 8 age groups, 4 education groups, 16 regions of 
origin 9 census divisions and 3 census years. The regressions are weighted according to the number of 
cases underlying each observation; the ‘t’ statistics are computed from robust standard errors. 
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Table 8 
Intermarriage and Citizenship in 1980 
 
Origin Region Proportion 
Intermarried 
Proportion 
Citizen 
Past/Present 
Immigrant Stock 
Mexico 0.31 0.27 0.27
Central America 0.34 0.31 0.08
Caribbean 0.22 0.48 0.15
South America 0.29 0.32 0.11
Scandinavia 0.73 0.40 7.93
UK and Ireland 0.76 0.50 7.74
Western Europe 0.74 0.57 2.70
Southern Europe 0.36 0.61 1.38
Central/Eastern Europe 0.65 0.70 3.55
Russian Empire 0.42 0.73 2.71
East Asia 0.31 0.46 0.32
Southeast Asia 0.28 0.45 0.06
India/Southwest Asia 0.19 0.28 0.06
Middle East/Asia Minor 0.37 0.54 0.41
Africa 0.45 0.37 0.10
Australia and New Zealand 0.60 0.43 0.43
 
Note: Derived from the 5 Percent census sample for 1980. The base is foreign-born persons who were aged 
20-39, who were married after arriving in the US and who were in their first marriage with spouse present. 
Intermarriage means being married to a partner born in the US; citizenship means being a US citizen by 
naturalization.  Past immigrant stock is the average share of the population in the censuses between 1860 
and 1970.   
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Table 9 
Opinion on the Net Benefit of Immigrant Groups 
 
 Net Benefit of Immigrants by Origin 
(%) 
Past/Present Immigrant Stock (%) 
Immigrant 
group 
1982 Poll 
Roper 
1985 Poll 
USA 
Today 
/CNN 
1993 Poll 
USA 
Today 
/CNN 
Immigrant 
Stock 
1910/1980 
Immigrant 
Stock 
1950/1980 
Immigrant  
Stock 
1960/1990 
English 60 -- -- 6.27 1.83 2.05
Irish 55 73 65 15.10 2.88 2.97
Jews 50 -- -- -- -- --
Germans 46 -- -- 5.28 0.97 1.23
Italians 46 -- -- 3.91 2.43 2.84
Poles 41 65 50 0.19 2.54 2.88
Japanese 29 -- -- 1.12 0.21 0.40
Chinese 25 56 28 0.40 0.19 0.16
Mexicans 21 7 -30 0.26 0.36 0.19
Koreans -6 29 20 0.07 0.01 0.02
Vietnamese -18 17 -5 0.00 0.00 0.00
Haitians -29 -4 -46 0.00 0.02 0.04
Iranians -- -12 -48 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cubans -50 -26 -40 0.00 0.06 0.15
 
Sources : Opinion on net benefit of immigrants from Lynch and Simon (2003), pp 44-5.  
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Table 10 
Opinion towards Immigrant Groups 
 
Immigrant group Favourable 
Opinion  
Positively 
Portrayed 
Friends/ 
Neighbours 
Immigrant 
Stock 
1960/1990 
Africa 6.05 4.83 1.65 0.11 
Europe 6.55 6.59 1.51 1.92 
Middle East 5.07 4.00 1.70 0.41 
Mexico 5.16 3.94 0.64 0.19 
Central and South America 5.75 4.45 1.43 0.10 
Cuba 4.87 3.85 0.95 0.15 
Other Caribbean islands 5.29 4.25 1.71 0.17 
India 5.77 4.87 0.71 0.03 
China 5.97 5.29 0.49 0.16 
Japan 6.21 5.81 1.06 0.40 
Philippines 5.87 4.84 1.24 0.17 
Other Asia 5.27 4.55 0.89 -- 
 
Source: Roper Center survey reference USPSRA1997-KR97005. The data covers 1200 respondents 
excluding the oversamples of Blacks and Hispanics.   
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DATA APPENDIX 
Census Variables 
The following variables are taken from the IPUMS website at: 
http://www.ipums.umn.edu/usa/index.html 
Sample restriction 
Men aged between 25 and 64 
Individual-Level Variables 
Annual wage and salary income (INCWAGE) 
Annual hours worked: weeks worked last year (WKSWORK1) × usual hours worked per week 
(UHRSWORK) 
Hourly wages: annual earnings/annual hours worked 
Education groups: (EDUCREC) coded into four categories: less than high school (codes 1-6); 
high school (code 7); 1-3 years of college (code 8); 4+ years of college (code 9).  
Years since immigration:  from year of immigration (YRIMMIG, which is intervalled) and census 
year. Origin group years since migration is the average of all immigrants from a given origin 
excluding the age/education group to which it is applied.  
Outliers 
We drop one hourly wage observation which appears to be an outlier – in the 1990 census, 
Australians and New Zealanders aged 25-29 with 1-3 years of college earn an hourly wage 49 
times larger than native-born Americans. 
Migrant Stock Variables 
Derived from birthplace (BPL) codes according to the following classification: 
Mexico (200), Central America (210), Caribbean (250-260), South America (300), Scandinavia 
(400-405), UK and Ireland (410-44), Western Europe (420-429), Southern Europe (430-440), 
Central/Eastern Europe (450-459), Russian Empire (460-465), East Asia (500-509), Southeast 
Asia (510-519), India/Southwest Asia (520-524, 548), Middle East/Asia Minor (530-547, 549), 
Africa (600), Australia and New Zealand (700).  
Ancestry is the first-mentioned ancestry (ANCESTR1), which contains a diverse range of origins 
that have been classified into the same groups as birthplace. We calculate the proportion aged 15 
and over claiming ancestry from these origin regions, excluding the foreign born and non-
responses but including in the base those who claimed ancestry from North America   
Source country variables 
GDP per capita: calculated from Maddison (2001), Appendix C pp. 267-333. Origin region GDP 
per capita calculated from countries and regional residuals, weighted by population.  
Education years: Average years of education for the population aged 15 years and over for 80 
countries, weighted by country populations withinin each of the 16 regions. Data from Barro and 
Lee, available at: http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html.  
Inequality: Gini coefficient of household income for 80 countries, weighted by population in each 
of the 16 origin regions. These data originally assembled by Deininger and Squire, now 
augmented and available at the WIDER Institute at: http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm. 
The observations selected are (almost) exclusively those labelled as ‘high quality’ with 
adjustments according to whether the underlying data were for income/expenditure, for gross/net 
income or for individuals/households. Census year observations are obtained from linear 
interpolation, where appropriate.  
Distance from Chicago: Distances in km from http://www.wcrl.ars.usda.gov/cec/java/lat-
long.htm. Origin region capitals are Mexico City, Panama City, Kingston Jamaica, Brasilia, 
Stockholm, London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, Moscow, Beijing, Jakarta, Mumbai, Jerusalem, 
Johannesburg and Sydney. Distances from the nine US divisions (Tables 6 and 7) are measured 
from: Boston, New York, Chicago, Kansas City, Baltimore, Memphis, Houston, Denver and Los 
Angeles.  
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Figure 1
Immigrant Relative Earnings and Past/Present Immigrant Stock, 
1980-2000
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Note: Ratio of to native-born of earnings for males aged 25-64 for 16 origin groups and three census years 
plotted against the ratio of the average share of population in the over the previous 120 years to the current 
share of population. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
